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What are the ground rules to be used for determining the scope and 
breadth of justice? What human activities does it cover, how much does it 
demand, what duties does it require? How are conflicting "intuitions" on 
these matters to be adjudicated? These questions are raised by Theodore 
Benditt's "The Demands of Justice: The Difference that Social Life 
Makes" when he tells us that we have a claim against society on grounds 
of justice only if "social life itself is in some relevant way responsible for 
the problems for which (we) seek relief." And Richard DeGeorge has 
also argued in "Property and Global Justice" that there is no injustice in 
some nations being rich and others poor if there is no constitution uniting 
them and 
no background institutions in accordance with which redistribution among na-
tions takes place and benefits and burdens distributed. In the absence of such 
institutions, and further in the absence of a true community among all nations, 
there is neither distributive justice nor injustice, since such justice is a function 
of some system. (p. 5) 1 
Both these claims suggest that inequalities-even basic and fundamen-
tal ones-are a matter of injustice, demanding rectification only if there is 
interdependence ("true community") and/or the well-off are responsible 
for .the situation of the deprived. Benditt summarizes this by reference to 
Nozick's example of ten Robinson Crusoes on ten separate islands who 
have different levels of well-being resulting from differences in ability or 
in the natural resources of the islands. Bendttt agrees with Nozick in hold-
ing that, because of the absence of relationships between them, none of 
the Crusoes would be "justified in insisting that some of the others trans-
fer resources to them." (He does say, however, that such a transfer would 
make the outcome more just or fairer, a point I'll discuss below.) 
My intuitions disagree. I'm inclined to think it is unjust that Crusoe A 
be well off and Crusoe B be impoverished and that justice demands that A 
help B. More generally, I'm inclined to think that the "basic truth" about 
justice is expressed by the following egalitarian ideal: the equal well-being 
of all persons at the highest possible level of well-being; that is, maximum 
equal well-being. And I'm inclined to think that justice demands the 
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promotion and protection of such a state of affairs.2 The project of ex-
plicating and defending such a view of justice is certainly a big one, and I 
won't be so foolish as to try to undertake it here. But let me just note that 
the project has three parts: First, the ideal needs to be clarified, specified, 
applied. A theory of the good needs to be developed and the concept of 
well-being given content. Second, a basic argument for at least prima facie 
equality needs to be given. Something must be said about what is so good 
"in itself' about equal well-being. The standard egalitarian intuition is 
that the similarities between human beings are morally a great deal more 
significant than the differences that develop between them; that their 
alikeness in being conscious, in being subject to pleasure and pain, fulfill-
ment and frustration, and in having conscious aims and 
purposes- "life-plans" -makes a condition in which some are more able 
to fulfill their plans than others unjustifiable, or at least difficult to justify. 
Third, the theory needs to be defended against the standard criticisms: 
that it is impossible to attain such equality; or that such equality would be 
highly inefficient; or that it overlooks morally significant claims of desert 
or merit; or that it is incompatible with liberty and democracy. Whether 
the theory can overcome some of these typical criticisms and even in-
corporate some of the values they rely on into a basically egalitarian frame-
work is, for the egalitarian-minded, the fundamental question. 
Benditt seems to accept the egalitarian ideal, at least to some extent, for 
he says that "a more equal society is a more just society, and, at least to 
that extent, a better society." And he says that redistribution among the 
Crusoes could lead to greater justice. But, he says" it is not the sort of jus-
tice it is obligatory to bring about. And this is his major claim: Not all of 
what is 'right' or 'good' on grounds of justice is obligatory. Some just 
states of affairs are such that we are obligated, required to promote and 
maintain them, but others are only desirable: We act well if we promote 
them, we are better persons if we do than if we do not, but we have no 
duty to do this. How, then, do we distinguish the obligatory from the 
merely desirable states of justice? His criterion is that we have duties to 
promote justice only when a person's deficiency in welfare is "attributable 
to his involvement in the collective." Consistent with this he tells us that 
if "one is impoverished through misfortune, or one's health is poor, there 
is no right to welfare to relieve these conditions." A society that did pro-
vide such help would be more caring and more just than one that did not, 
he says, but this is not one of the elements of justice required of society. 
I find this consequence of Benditt's view unsatisfactory at the level of 
moral intuitions. Now, one way to respond to his view would be to hold 
that the disadvantages that result from misfortune or ill health are not un-
connected to social institutions. Poor health could be responded to in such 
a way that it is not a disadvantage, and what is a misfortune in one form of 
social organization may be a mark of distinction in another. So one might 
be able to bring these deficiencies under the category of obligatory justice 
even on Benditt's terms; that is, accepting his criterion of causation by the 
collective as the necessary condition for duties. And in general it is argu-
able that the distinction between natural and socially induced deprivations 
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will be difficult to draw for creatures who are social beings as we are. Even 
if it can be drawn, very little would fall into the category of nonsocial 
deprivations. 
I would like, however, to push a different and more fundamental 
criticism. Consider the fact that .a certain proportion of people are born 
with various physical handicaps that make it difficult for them to achieve 
their life-plans. They start life at a disadvantage compared with nonhandi-
capped persons. But suppose that a moderate expenditure offunds to pro-
vide both training and special facilities (such as ramps for wheelchairs) 
would for many cancel the disadvantage. (We assume, furthermore, that 
the disadvantage is not the result of the collective.) Why shouldn't the 
provision of training and facilities be seen as a societal obligation on 
grounds of (egalitarian) justice? Benditt would presumably think that 
such provision is not obligatory, though he would hold that someone 
whose job skills are no longer adequate because of changed economic cir-
cumstances is owed help on groUllds of justice. Why obligatory aid in one 
case, but not in the other? At least at the level of 'intuitions,' the distinc-
tion seems arbitrary. 
Generalizing a bit, we should note that with regard 'to a particular 
inequality, we can distinguish at least three different dimensions for the 
deprivation: its cause (whether social or natural); its urgency; and the cost 
of rectifying it. Suppose in a given case the cause is not social, but the 
need is urgent and the cost of help is small. Then it may very well seem 
that the help ought to be provided, that it is a duty. On the other hand, a 
socially induced deprivation, which, however, is not urgent and would be 
expensive to rectify, may not seem to require action. What this shows is 
that there are other ways of distinguishing between the obligatory and 
desirable elements of justice, and Benditt has not given us enough ground 
for concluding that the cause of the inequality should play the dominant 
or only role in making the distinction. 
Turning now to the view that there is a basic distinction between the ob-
ligatory and merely desirable elements of justice, we should note that this 
is at least verbally strange. We naturally speak of what justice calls for, 
requires, demands. If justice involves X, it is natural to think that we or 
someone are obligated to promote and maintain X. Justice 'speaks' in 
terms of duty, not desirability. In fact, if we thought of some inequality 
that there was no duty to remove it but that it would be a good thing for it 
to be removed, we might say that the inequality is not unjust, but merely 
undesirable. That is, we have the alternative locution of saying that things 
not demanded by justice are not demanded by justice, but are good on 
some other moral value. 
This criticism may well be rejected as merely verbal (that is, it may be 
right that we speak of justice as demanding things, but we should change 
the concept to recognize the duty-desirability distinction), so I will not 
press it. Another alternative to Benditt's, and one which I do hold, is that 
whatever is good on grounds of justice is at least prima facie obligatory, 
but may not be obligatory, all things considered. It may not be obligatory, 
all things considered, because its provision is too expensive or is only 
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possible at too great a sacrifice of other values. On an egalitarian view of 
justice, every inequality of well-being ought to be undone, other things 
being equal, but, unfortunately, things are not always equal. This way of 
understanding the matter accounts for Benditt's intuitions that not every 
element of j'Jstice is ultimately obligatory, but it is not subject to the criti-
cism that what has been picked out as decisive-causation by the 
'collective' -is arbitrary, or at least of no greater significance than other 
factors. There are a number of factors; a plurality of difficult-to-weigh 
considerations, which make it sometimes permissible not to promote 
what is, other things being equal, a duty to promote. 
I suppose that what is ultimately behind Benditt's view is the idea that 
justice has basically to do with dividing up J,he fruits and burdens of social 
cooperation. Rawls clearly starts from this perspective and sees principles 
of social justice as ways of defining "the appropriate benefits and burdens 
of social cooperation." From this perspective a notion of justice that looks 
at how people fare independently of their interconnections might be dis-
missed as a concept of "cosmic justice" (even "poetic justice") , an ideal 
of how things ought to be, but involving no obligations or requirements. 
But for the dismissal of this view, soine argument is needed. If some 
people are born into well-heeled, comfortable, affluent societies through 
no 'merit' uf their own, and others-who possess every bit as much 
'intrinsic worth' as the former-are born into poor and deprived societies 
through no fault of their own, it is not obvious that the former owe 
nothing, in justice, to the latter. A cosmic 'crime' might demand a quite 
secular rectification. If the ultimate principle that Benditt (and Rawls) 
relies on is that individuals owe nothing to other individuals unless they 
are in some way responsible for their ills, then this individualist dictum 
needs to be explicitly brought out and some of its counterintuitive conse-
quences faced (consider, for example, good Samaritan rescue cases). 
I do not wish to deny that the interconnectedness of people, or lack 
thereof, is relevant to determining our actual ("all things considered") 
duties to others with regard to justice. My inclination is to think that it is 
one of a plurality of considerations relevant to the matter, along with such 
things as cost, urgency, the likely effectiveness of aid, and the degree of 
responsibility people have for their own misfortune.· This is a different 
way of understanding the scope of justice·and the duties involved than the 
way Benditt gives us, and my argument with him, in short, is that this way 
is just as intuitively plausible as his and that he has not (yet) given us 
enough further argument to persuade us to adopt his point of view. 
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